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A B S T R A C T
Environmental models are ubiquitous in assessing the environmental impacts of
planned projects. Modelling is an inferential process and includes various mechanisms
to address the uncertainty of the outcome. In this article, we acknowledge the con-
tinuum of uncertainty assessments and identify the legal mechanisms with which
Finnish judicial review—characterised by broad scope of review and in-house expert
judges—has encountered model uncertainty. Closely examining 10 waters-related
cases heard by the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, we explain the porous
yet substantial boundary between science and law revealed by the cases. The cases
demonstrate the elegance with which courts can strike a balance between the contin-
gent precautionary principle, gradually decreasing scientific uncertainty, and the pro-
cedural constraints under which they operate. We conclude by analysing the traces to-
wards reciprocality and adaptivity the cases reveal, encouraged by the iterative
modelling mechanism and challenged by the constitutional restrictions on the scope of
review.
K E Y W O R D S : Judicial review, environmental models, groundwater regulation, water
governance, the EU Water Framework Directive
1 . T H E B O U N D A R I E S O F S C I E N C E I N J U D I C I A L R E V I E W
The boundaries of science—where science ends and society begins—have been
addressed in sociology,1 and philosophers have pondered the difference between sci-
entific questions and questions in science,2 or how legal questions can influence
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1 Thomas F Gieryn, ‘Boundaries of Science’ in Sheila Jasanoff and others (eds), Handbook of Science and
Technology Studies (Sage Publications 2001) 393.
2 Brian J Preston, ‘Limits of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms’ (1995) 13 Australian Bar Review 148, 169
refers to this distinction Passmore created when he describes environmental disputes as ‘at least as much
value disputes as scientific controversies’—and that scientific experts can aid in solving the latter but less
so the former; J Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions
(Duckworth 1974) 213, 43–5.
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scientific answers.3 Using environmental models in the administrative-judicial deci-
sion-making is a prime example of this boundary. Or perhaps better, the absence of
it: models can be so intertwined in regulatory instruments that one cannot decipher
where science ends and regulation begins.4 As pointed out by Lee and others, models
themselves can even ‘contribute to the very possibility of governing the impact’ of
major infrastructure developments.5 Hence, the scientific and legal processes can be
understood as a continuum of normativity, where (1) gathering information; (2)
analysing it with scientific models; (3) administrative decision-making drawing on
those analyses; and (4) reviewing the authorisations in courts all entail axiological
decisions.6
In this article, we focus on the uncertainty assessments that are conducted along
the way. Uncertainty is addressed with various mechanisms, both scientific and legal.
By way of focusing on uncertainty, we wish not to insinuate that only precise models
are desirable, since uncertainty and its assessment are essential features in models.
Uncertainty is, also, the discourse the judges and scientists share.7 Temporary per-
mits, enhanced monitoring obligations or requests of regular permit reviews comple-
menting the reality of gradually decreasing scientific uncertainty exemplify the legal
mechanisms. Also, permit duration can be coupled with the cycles of recurrent know-
ledge production systems. Our cases, however, show how our example court requires
at times perhaps an even unrealistically high level of certainty from models, offering
a good reason to analyse more closely this science and law boundary. We delve into
these mechanisms in our cases and conclude our analysis in the final section.8
Environmental impacts have been assessed through the history of environmental
governance. Our interest in models springs from their role in contemporary law- and
policy-making that embraces them.9 Environmental decision-making has relied on
these assessments—and, depending on their mandate, courts have reviewed them.
Models are often portrayed as the best and most effective solution for the assessment
of environmental impacts. As with any silver bullet, they are ‘expected to magically
generate answers to urgent environmental questions, often with five significant digits
3 Lena Wahlberg, Legal Questions and Scientific Answers: Ontological Differences and Epistemic Gaps in the
Assessment of Causal Relations (Lund University 2010) 15, 16, 27.
4 Elizabeth Fisher, Pasky Pascual and Wendy Wagner, ‘Rethinking Judicial Review of Expert Agencies’
(2015) 93 Tex L Rev 1681, 1716; Thomas O McGarity and Wendy Elizabeth Wagner, Bending Science:
How Special Interests Corrupt Public Health Research (HUP 2008) 2.
5 Maria Lee and others, ‘Techniques of Knowing in Administration: Co-production, Models, and
Conservation Law’ (2018) 45(3) J Law Soc 427, 427.
6 Tiina Paloniitty, The (In)Compatibility Between Adaptive Management and Law: Regulating Agricultural
Runoff in the EU (Juvenes Print 2018) 5. The judiciary has been considered as an actor in the decision-
making process also in Emma Lees, ‘Allocation of Decision-Making Power under the Habitats Directive’
(2016) 28(2) JEL 191.
7 Models producing imprecise predictions are also valuable, and can even be consistently preferable to more
precise ones, Alkistis Elliott-Graves, ‘The Value of Imprecise Prediction’ (2020) 12(4) Philos Theor Pract
Biol 1, 8, 14.
8 The legal mechanisms are analysed in detail in Section 5.2; Section 2 explains models as scientific tools
that address uncertainty, and Section 4.4 examines a case coupling the scientific and legal mechanisms. See
respectively texts to n 168, n 19 and n 141.
9 Elizabeth Fisher, Pasky Pascual and Wendy Wagner, ‘Understanding Environmental Models in Their Legal
and Regulatory Context’ (2010) 22(2) JEL 251, 254.
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and remarkable precision’.10 Perhaps unsurprisingly, models have caused consider-
able challenges for regulators and, eventually, the courts.11 Our fillip is accountabil-
ity: the danger of modelling lies in rendering normative decisions as technical or
scientific conclusions, and thus hiding value decisions (on uncertainties) under a veil
of science.12 Modelling practice is an inferential process: modellers make choices
with normative impacts, and those decisions can be so greatly embedded in the
‘warp and weft’ of a model’s output that they remain hidden when the substance
matter is dealt with in court.13 In other words, the scientific process entails mecha-
nisms for addressing uncertainties, but the legal sphere may not always be aware of
the assessments and decisions, not to mention their implications for the outcome.
Our example, Finland, is a fruitful jurisdiction for studies on the science and law
interface for various reasons. In Finnish administrative courts, investigation is inquisi-
torial and active and the court is equipped with in-house scientific and technical ex-
pertise, the ‘expert judges’. The process is also reformatory, allowing the shaping of
the planned project and the permit conditions during court review. The understand-
ing of trias politica adopted in Finland vests the administrative courts with a broad
scope of review—among the widest in Europe but not the widest possible.14 We
have narrowed our investigation down to models in waters-related matters—not
only because those are abundant in a land of 5,123 groundwater basins, 4,617 lake
water bodies and 1,913 river water bodies—but also because we anticipate that the
theme might be most fruitful in cases relevant to the implementation of the EU
Water Framework Directive (WFD) and its daughter directive, the Groundwater
Directive (GWD).15 The WFD has established a realm in which questions on the
10 Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher and Pasky Pascual, ‘Misunderstanding Models in Environmental and
Public Health Regulation’ (2010) 18 NYU Envtl LJ 293, 294.
11 ibid 296 fn 11; Pasky Pascual, Wendy Wagner and Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Making Method Visible: Improving
the Quality of Science-based Regulation’ (2012) 2 Mich J Envtl Admin L 429, 433; Emily Hammond
Meazell, ‘Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science’
(2011) Mich Law Rev 733.
12 Pascual, Wagner and Fisher, ibid 434. As Käkönen and Hirsch note, ‘ . . . technical rendering refers, im-
portantly, to a scientized rationality, which hides politics and depoliticizes [development] decisions’ in
Mira Käkönen and Philip Hirsch, ‘The Anti-politics of Mekong Knowledge Production’ in François
Molle, Tira Foran and Mira Käkönen (eds), Contested Waterscapes in the Mekong Region: Hydropower,
Livelihoods and Governance (Earthscan 2009) 333, 343.
13 Wagner, Fisher and Pascual (n 10) 308; Fisher, Pascual and Wagner, (n 9) 257.
14 See text to n 57ff for a closer description of the Finnish system, bearing a close resemblance to the
Swedish one. Gitanjali Nain Gill, ‘Environmental Justice in India: The National Green Tribunal and
Expert Members’ (2016) 5(1) TEL 175, 187; Patrick Ky, ‘Qualifications, Weight of Opinion, Peer
Review and Methodology: A Framework for Understanding the Evaluation of Science in Merits Review’
(2012) 24(2) JEL 207; Brian J Preston, ‘The Judicial Development of the Precautionary Principle’
(2018) 35 EPLJ 123.
15 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a
framework for Community action in the field of water policy [2000] OJ L327/1 (‘WFD’), Directive
2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the protection of
groundwater against pollution and deterioration [2006] OJ 372/19 (‘GWD’). The amounts are according
to the WFD’s classifications that cover lakes larger than 0.5 km2 and rivers with basins greater than 100
km2. In the National Land Survey of Finland’s statistics the country has at least 168,000 lakes or ponds
larger than 500 m2, Maanmittauslaitos, ‘Suomi 57 000–168 000 järven maa’ (12 July 2019) <https://
www.maanmittauslaitos.fi/ajankohtaista/suomi-57-000-168-000-jarven-maa> accessed 15 September
2020.
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interface between science and law are customary, the Directive in itself being a legal
tool including regulatory strategy models.16
We examine the legal and scientific mechanisms for addressing model uncertainty
and study whether the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland (‘the Court’, ‘the
SAC’) has succeeded in negotiating a balance between the two. Has the Court cor-
rectly understood the extent of the scientific mechanisms? How has the Court
reacted to, or used, models in its work? Has the Court identified the iterative nature
of the modelling process and managed to address it with the legal mechanisms at its
disposal? By asking these questions in only one jurisdiction, we concur with the
scholars who emphasise the contingent nature of environmental law and its ubiqui-
tous environmental principles.17 Indeed, some of our cases demonstrate the elegance
with which courts can strike a balance between the precautionary principle, gradually
decreasing scientific uncertainty, and the procedural and substantial realities that
criss-cross around the matter.18
This article unfolds as follows. We begin Section 2 by explaining more about the
various commitments that surface and groundwater modelling entails, and their con-
sequences for uncertainty assessment. Then we first set the stage by describing
aspects of European Union and domestic environmental regulation (Section 3.1)
and Finnish administrative procedural law (Section 3.2) that are significant when
dealing with science-heavy matters in general and our sample of cases in particular.
In Section 4, we analyse 10 rulings in which the Court took a stance on models and
the uncertainty of impacts. These 10 cases are divided into two groups. In the first
set, the Court discussed the uncertainties of modelling in general (Section 4.1), and
in the second group, these general aspects influenced the determination of the
authorization’s legal perimeters in particular (Section 4.2). Lastly, in Section 5, we
discuss the findings. Did the modellers and the Court seem to understand each
other? Did the Court manage to take the inferential process into account? We con-
clude in Section 5.3 by sketching a mutually reinforcing way forward.
2 . A S S E S S I N G E N V I R O N M E N T A L I M P A C T S W I T H M O D E L S
As noted above, modelling is an inferential process and the choices taken during
modelling make the model’s outcomes evaluative in nature.19 In the following, ‘mod-
els’ refer to aquatic ecosystem models, a subset of mathematical models used in both
groundwater and surface water ecosystems. The decisions that the modellers are
forced to make include—but are not limited to—choices over competing models, se-
lection of model parameters and the selection of methods to estimate predictive
16 Fisher, Pascual and Wagner (n 9) 256. There is ample reseach on the challenges encountered or created
by the WFD as a science-heavy regulatory instrument, see eg Daniel Hering and others, ‘The European
Water Framework Directive at the Age of 10: A Critical Review of the Achievements with
Recommendations for the Future’ (2010) 408(19) Sci Total Environ 4007; Henrik Josefsson and Lasse
Baaner, ‘The Water Framework Directive—A Directive for the Twenty-First Century?’ (2011) 23(3) JEL
463; Henrik Josefsson, ‘Ecological Status as a Legal Construct—Determining its Legal and Ecological
Meaning’ (2015) 27(2) JEL 231.
17 Eloise Scotford, Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law (Hart 2017) 272, 3, 11;
Ole W Pedersen, ‘The Contingent Foundations of Environmental Law’ (2018) 30 JEL 359, 359, 363.
18 See texts to n 141 and n 152.
19 Text to n 13; Fisher, Pascual and Wagner (n 9) 251, 279–82.
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uncertainties or risks for cost-benefit analysis, all of which may have normative con-
sequences.20 Whatever the approach or complexity of the model, it should be borne
in mind that models are always only simplifications of reality and can never repro-
duce real-life patterns precisely, thus being inherently uncertain.21 The modellers
and judges share the same object of interest, they meet at this uncertainty assess-
ment, with both having their own tools for tackling it. The legal mechanisms for
negotiating its realities are discussed later in Sections 4 and 5, but before that, let us
take a brief look at the modellers’ toolbox for addressing the uncertainties.
2.1 The Tricks of the ‘Simplifying the Reality’ Trade
Environmental models are tools of environmental impact assessment.22 For example,
in water governance, models help in assessing the impacts of a planned project on
the nearby surface or groundwaters,23 evaluating the impacts of water withdrawal on
the quantity and quality of groundwater,24 and assessing the impacts of nutrient load-
ings on the ecological status of lakes.25 Models also assist the environmental impact
assessment (EIA) process in quantifying the effects of changing the locations or vol-
umes of the planned actions.26 Also, modelling is coupled with various steps of the
WFD’s processes. Models are part of identification, designing, implementation, and
evaluation—all pivotal elements of the WFD’s management cycles.27 This is why the
WFD has gained a reputation as including regulatory strategy models: models are
deeply intertwined to its structure.28 The uncertainty assessments conducted in the
scientific and legal processes described below can thus have a cumulative impact and
their interdependencies may decrease the detachment of each aspect, when for ex-
ample gathering of data and choice of models are connected together more closely.29
20 Jens Christian Refsgaard and others, ‘Uncertainty in the environmental modelling process–a framework
and guidance’ (2007) 22(11) Environ Model Softw 1543. The concern of losing moments of significant
decision-making from sight is not only hypothetical, Käkönen and Hirsch (n 12) 343, 338–9.
21 RA Letcher and AJ Jakeman, ‘Types of Environmental Models’ in Catherine M Marquette (ed), Water
and Development: Encyclopedia of life support systems, Volume II (UNESCO Encyclopedia of Life Support
Systems) 131; Fisher, Pascual and Wagner (n 9) 253; National Research Council (NRC), Models in
Environmental Regulatory Decision Making (National Academies Press, Washington DC 2007) 31.
22 AJ Jakeman, RA Letcher and JP Norton, ‘Ten Iterative Steps in Development and Evaluation of
Environmental Models’ (2006) 21 Environ Model Softw 602.
23 Qinggai Wang and others, ‘A Review of Surface Water Quality Models’ (2013) 1–7. Sci World J, 1; James
W Mercer and Charles R Faust, ‘Ground-Water Modeling: An Overview’ (1980) 18 Groundwater 108.
24 Hans Jørgen Henriksen and others, ‘Assessment of Exploitable Groundwater Resources of Denmark by
use of Ensemble Ressource Indicators and Numerical Groundwater-surface Water Model’ (2008) 348(1–
2) J Hydrol 224.
25 Niina Kotamäki and others, ‘Statistical Dimensioning of Nutrient Loading Reduction—LLR Assessment
Tool for Lake Managers’ (2015) 56 Environ Manag 480.
26 EIA is a specific administrative process for impact assessment and location decision, taking place before
administrative authorization procedure and regulated with Directive 2011/92/EU of 13 December 2011
on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (codification)
[2012] OJ L 026/1 (‘EIA Directive’). See text to n 69ff on the role of the EIA in our cases.
27 Refsgaard and others (n 20) 1546.
28 Fisher, Pascual and Wagner (n 9) 256.
29 This is described as the continuum of normativity above at text to n 6.
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The complexity, approaches and nature of models vary depending on the purpose
of modelling and on the environmental system that is being modelled.30
Hydrological systems are often modelled using deterministic, process-based models
that are built on known physical, chemical or biological theories and expressed as
multiple mathematical equations of the system components.31 Process-based models
can predict ecosystem responses in hypothetical situations, which make them useful
in impact assessments. However, they are ‘data-needy’, as they require large amounts
of empirical data to calibrate the model to local conditions and to verify the model’s
performance.32 The other group of models is empirical—statistical models—which
are derived entirely from observational data.33 Statistical models describe relation-
ships and patterns between variables of interest, and they are often simpler than
process-based models. However, their predictive capability does not extend outside
the range of the observed data.34
2.2 Uncertainty: Sources, Causes and Mechanisms for Addressing it
Modelling complex interrelated system dynamics and projecting the results of policy
decisions into the future can be very uncertain.35 Uncertainty can be described as a
decision-maker’s lack of knowledge, or lack of confidence, about the different out-
comes of the decision.36 Attitudes towards uncertainty can range from total denial to
accepting it as an intrinsic part of science,37 but uncertainty can also be so over-
whelming that courts have even used it as an excuse to avoid closer scrutiny of the
factual matters.38 However, the most common view in environmental governance is
that uncertainty is to some extent unavoidable, but it should be quantified by keeping
facts and values separated.39 Thus, as debated as the separation of facts and values
30 Letcher and Jakeman (n 21) 2.
31 Gayathri K Devia, BP Ganasri and GS Dwarakish, ‘A Review on Hydrological Models’ (2015) 4 Aquat
Procedia 1001.
32 BJ Robson, ‘When do Aquatic Systems Models Provide Useful Predictions, What is Changing, and What
is Next?’ (2014) 61 Environ Model Softw 287, 288.
33 ibid.
34 ibid. Statistical models are often used in describing eg ecological phenomena for which data availability is
often limited and process-based models hard to validate, Letcher and Jakeman (n 21) 2, 4.
35 JC Ascough and others, ‘Future Research Challenges for Incorporation of Uncertainty in Environmental
and Ecological ecision-making’ (2008) 219(3) Ecol Model 383, 384–5; S Polasky and others, ‘Decision-
making Under Great Uncertainty: Environmental Management in an Era of Global Change’ (2011)
26(8) Trends Ecol Evol 398–9.
36 Ascough and others (ibid) 387–8; Katja Sigel, Bernd Klauer and Claudia Pahl-Wostl, ’Conceptualising
Uncertainty in Environmental Decision-making: The Example of the EU Water Framework Directive’
(2010) 69(3) Ecol Econ 502.
37 J Arjan Wardekker and others, ‘Uncertainty Communication in Environmental Assessments: Views from
the Dutch Science-policy Interface’ (2008) 11(7) Environ Sci Policy 627, 630.
38 This attitude has been reported eg in Italy, where the administrative courts could also review the substan-
tial side but are reluctant to do so, Roberto Caranta, ‘Still Searching for a Reliable Script: Access to
Scientific Knowledge in Environmental Litigation in Italy’ (2018) 27(4) EEELR 158, 168.
39 Wardekker and others (n 37); JP Van der Sluijs, ‘Uncertainty as a Monster in the Science-policy
Interface: Four Coping Strategies’ (2005) 52 Water Sci Technol 87, 90.
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may be, for modelling it is the starting point, and in this article we take that as a
given.40
Model uncertainty stems from several sources.41 As Refsgaard and others have
investigated, already framing the problem, addressing the right spatio-temporal scope
and choosing the relevant output variables include decisions that generate uncer-
tainty. Also, defining the system to be modelled—for example, whether to model
only the groundwater processes or also include surface water interactions—is a critic-
al decision included in the initial phase of the modelling procedure.42 Secondly,
model structure uncertainty arises as the modelled system and the processes are sim-
plified.43 Modelling objectives ought to impact the complexity of the model structure
and the number of parameters to be estimated since disregarding important aspects
can lead to an overly narrow examination of the phenomenon and to increased un-
certainty.44 Thirdly, uncertainty over the input data—such as local weather condi-
tions and geology—can lead to insufficient model performance and inadequate
predictions. Data uncertainty can stem from insufficient and poorly allocated sam-
pling: empirical measurements must be collected frequently enough and over a suffi-
ciently long period. In three of our cases data uncertainty became an issue, making it
a legally highly relevant aspect of modelling.45 Fourthly, insufficient knowledge of
the right parameter values creates uncertainty. As physical and biological parame-
ters—such as hydraulic conductivity or aquifer thickness—change from location to
location, poorly selected or insufficiently known values inevitably affect the perform-
ance of the model.46 Finally, especially complex models suffer from uncertainty origi-
nating from the numerical and resolution approximations and other technical aspects
of modelling.47
Depending on the cause, uncertainty can be divided into two categories.48 So-
called stochastic (or aleatory) uncertainty relates to variability and randomness,
which are inherent in natural systems.49 For example, unpredictable weather condi-
tions cause stochastic uncertainty. This type of uncertainty cannot be reduced, but it
can be characterised and quantified, and thus communicated to the decision-maker.50
On the other hand, epistemic uncertainty stems from imperfect knowledge of the
system’s behaviour or lack of monitoring data. This type of uncertainty can be
40 Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and other Essays (HUP 2002); Maksymilian Del
Mar, ‘Relational Jurisprudence – Vulnerability between Fact and Value’ (2012) 2(2) Law Method 63.
41 There are even comprehensive lists of the uncertainty sources related to model-based assessment in
Refsgaard and others (n 22) 1546–7; L Uusitalo and others, ‘An Overview of Methods to Evaluate
Uncertainty of Deterministic Models in Decision Support’ (2015) 63 Environ Model Softw 24, 25.
42 Refsgaard and others (n 20) 1544, 1546.
43 ibid 1547–8.
44 ibid 1544–5.
45 Cases at texts to n 123, n 129 and n 136.
46 Refsgaard and others (n 20) 1547.
47 ibid 1547, 1552. In one of our cases the court embarked on analysing very technical aspects of the model
in questions, see text to n 140.
48 Uusitalo and others (n 41) 25. Linguistic uncertainty can be added as the third category, ibid 25.
49 ibid 25.
50 ibid 25–6.
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reduced: collecting more data and developing better models creates a more realistic
and less uncertain understanding of the phenomenon. 51
As seen in one of the cases we analyse, if these frailties are discovered and ana-
lysed only at the highest court of appeal, they can have drastic impacts on the matter:
an originally accepted plan can even be completely rejected.52 Thus, the tragedy is
that, when left unrecognised, the boundary that these and other technical niceties
erect may hide decisions with normative impact from the judges’ purview.53 In a per-
fect world, transparent and comprehensive documentation of the modelling process
would make the boundary less opaque54 and the assessments that models produced
would be salient, credible and legitimate to meet the judges’ needs55—these objec-
tives being, however, at odds with the inherent uncertainties and limitations of mod-
els.56 Until we come to the perfect world with perfect models, the courts must make
do with what they encounter in their case files. But before seeing how the Court has
fared in its task, we next explain the procedural and substantial constraints under
which our Court operates.
3 . T H E S U B S T A N C E A N D P R O C E D U R E O F T H E L E G A L M E C H A N I S M S
3.1 A Very Brief Introduction to EU and Finnish Water Pollution Regulation
To contextualise the cases we analyse in the next section, we explain the relevant EU
and Finnish regulations briefly. Two pieces of EU environmental regulation—the
WFD and the GWD—are the protagonists in our study and two others—the
Habitats Directive and the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive—play sup-
porting roles.57 With the WFD, the Union has created a decentralised water manage-
ment structure that strives for a shared aim, the good status of all Union waters.
Waters are listed as water bodies and managed with River Basin Management Plans
(RBMPs), assessing their quality in 6-year cycles; the process is meticulously regu-
lated in the WFD’s Annexes.58 Surface waters have multiple categories that must be
assessed to achieve the objective of good status, but for groundwater, only the
51 ibid 25–6. See also HM Regan, M Colyvan and MA Burgman, ‘A Taxonomy and Treatment of
Uncertainty for Ecology and Conservation Biology’ (2002) 12 Ecol Appl 618.
52 This, then again, can—rightfully so—cause sentiment of flimsical decisions or generate questions on
whether the matter should have been remitted to the first instance for reassessment of facts; see text to n
90.
53 Text to n 6.
54 P Schmolke and others, ‘Ecological Models Supporting Environmental Decision-Making: A Strategy for
the Future’ (2010) 25 Trends Ecol Evol 479, 482; N Crout and others, ‘Good Modelling Practice’
(2008) US Environmental Protection Agency Papers 73.
55 David W Cash and others, ‘Knowledge sySstems for Sustainable Development’ (2003) 100(14) Proc
Natl Acad Sci 8086.
56 In the same ideal world, decision-makers and stakeholders would be included in model development,
resulting in more trust in the model and efficient knowledge exchange between modellers and other par-
ticipants, Jakeman, Letcher and Norton (n 22). In other words there should be public participation dur-
ing the modelling process.
57 The latter two are studied here only as implemented in Finland. Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21
May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora [1992] OJ L 206/7 (‘The
Habitats Directive’) and the EIA Directive.
58 Especially the WFD Annex V; Andrea M Keessen and others, ‘European River Basin Districts: Are they
Swimming in the Same Implementation Pool?’ (2010) JEL 22(2) 197.
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quantitative and chemical statuses are assessed.59 The normativity of the good status
objective and its significance to individual undertakings was long debated, but in
2015 the CJEU resolved the matter in its landmark Weser ruling.60 From then on,
the WFD has encompassed two legal norms: the non-deterioration principle and the
good status objective, both of which also bind individual authorizations.61
During the drafting of the WFD, the legislator could not reach agreement on the
particular provisions on groundwater chemical status, thus, it warranted a separated
directive on pollution—as a ‘daughter directive’, the GWD complements the
WFD.62 Since 2006, the GWD has represented a mature version of groundwater
management in its focus on chemical and quantitative statuses, instead of merely
revolving around needs for water abstraction.63 In the spirit of the WFD’s ‘good sta-
tus’ objective, the deterioration of groundwater quality must be identified and
ascending detrimental tendencies reversed.64 Natural variability continues to be a
challenge in establishing EU-wide quality standards for most pollutants, so an analyt-
ical framework steers monitoring and assessment.65 Implementation in the Member
States builds on their pre-existing water management—coupling the GWD with a
strong history of groundwater management has resulted in, for example, develop-
ment of 3D models of groundwater bodies supporting the water management.66
Regarding the Finnish implementation, the Finnish legislation has long included a
strict prohibition against groundwater pollution with no exemptions, being thus
more rigorous than the minimum level set in the Union regulation and one of three
total bans in Finnish environmental legislation.67 The strict prohibition was
59 Respectively, the WFD Annex V, 1.1 and 1.2 and the WFD Annex V, 2.1.2 and 2.3.2.
60 Case C-461/13 Bund v Germany [2015] ECR I-433 (‘Weser case’).
61 HFMW van Rijswick and Chris W Backes, ‘Ground Breaking Landmark Case on Environmental Quality
Standards?’ (2015) 12 JEELP 363; Tiina Paloniitty, ‘The Weser Case: Case C-461/13 BUND V
GERMANY’ (2016) 28(1) JEL 151, 152; Johanna Söderasp and Maria Pettersson, ‘Before and after the
Weser Case: Legal Application of the Water Framework Directive Environmental Objectives in Sweden’
(2019) 31(2) JEL 265.
62 Defining quantitative groundwater status was not similarly challenging. WFD art 17; Philippe
Quevauviller, ‘From the 1996 Groundwater Action Programme to the 2006 Groundwater Directive—
What Have We Done, What Have We Learnt, What Is the Way Ahead?’ (2008) J Environ Monit (10)4
408, 411.
63 L De Stefano and others, ‘Easier said Than Done? The Establishment of Baseline Groundwater
Conditions for the Implementation of the Water Framework Directive in Spain’ (2013) 27(7) Water
Resour Manage 2691, 2697. The GWD has also faced fierce criticism as probably not having any signifi-
cant operational impact, Wojciech Rejman, ‘EU Water Framework Directive versus Real Needs of
Groundwater Management’ (2007) 21(8) Water Resour Manage 1363.
64 GWD art 5 and Annex IV.
65 ‘DPSIR’ or Driver, Pressure, State, Impact, Response Framework, European Commission, Analysis of
Pressures and Impacts—Guidance Document No 3 (2003). Nitrates and pesticides are regulated with
quality standards, GWD Annex I.
66 Lisbeth Flindt Jørgensen, Karen G Villholth and Jens Christian Refsgaard, ‘Groundwater Management
and Protection in Denmark: A Review of Pre-conditions, Advances and Challenges’ (2017) 33(6) Int J
Water Resour Dev 868, 879.
67 Other total bans forbid polluting soil or sea. The GWD settles for ‘preventing or limiting’ pollution, the
GWD art 6. Environmental Protection Act (‘EPA’, ympäristönsuojelulaki 527/2014) 17 §. Minimum har-
monisation, common in legal drafting of the EU environmental law, allows Member States to exceed the
agreed levels of environmental protection; the theme is thoroughly studied in Lorenzo Squintani, Beyond
Minimum Harmonisation: Gold-Plating and Green-Plating of European Environmental Law (CUP 2019).
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discussed in one of our cases; it turned out that ‘strict’ does not equal with scientific
certainty of no forbidden impacts taking place. Despite of its central role in the EU
groundwater governance, in none of the cases we analysed was the GWD even men-
tioned. We assume that this was due to the established status of the strict prohibition
and the reality in which the legal norms are part of the ‘parent directive’, the WFD.68
Otherwise, the Finnish Environmental Protection Act (EPA) currently encom-
passes all regulation on environmental pollution.69 The EPA vests the authorities
with discretionary powers to define the closer contents of environmental permits.70
The act implements the Industrial Emissions Directive, thus revolving around the
concept of (significant) ‘pollution’, being harmful environmental impact caused by
human activity.71 The starting point of the Finnish EPA is that the applicant is enti-
tled to approval as long as the permit conditions are such that the (threat of) signifi-
cant pollution is prevented.72 Thus, the certainty of estimated impacts is pivotal:
there are legal grounds to reject the plan only when the proposed plan cannot be
shaped so that the forbidden impacts become unlikely.73 Sustainable development is
mentioned as a rationale of the EPA. However, the provisions on permit consider-
ation constrain the Court’s ‘review of legality’ to ‘significant pollution’, excluding
broader considerations on sustainability.74
Another act relevant to our cases is the Water Act, which regulates water con-
struction such as artificial groundwater plants.75 Importantly, the Water Act does not
share the objective of environmental protection, nor advancing sustainable develop-
ment: the Water Act is primarily about weighing and balancing the various interests
at stake, environmental good being only one of them.76 The EPA and the Water Act
both referred to the RBMPs as material that must be ‘taken into account’ in
decision-making, not constituting legal provision on which authorizations could be
based. By referring to the content of the RBMPs, the provisions dispensed with dir-
ect references to the good status objective or the non-deterioration principle, being
an original implementation solution—and in apparent conflict with the post-
Weserian WFD.77
68 Text to n 115. ‘Strict’ does neither mean forbid of all impacts: only impacts causing pollution are prohib-
ited, Erkki J Hollo, Vesioikeus (Water Law) (Edita 2014) 420–1. See also text to n 99.
69 Earlier the Water Act (vesilaki 587/2011) included provisions on water pollution.
70 EPA s 48.2.
71 EPA ss 1 and 2; Directive 2010/75/EU of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollu-
tion prevention and control) [2010] OJ L 334/17; Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange and Eloise Scotford,
Environmental Law: Text, Cases & Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2019) 419–20, 430–33.
72 EPA s 49.1 point 2); Ari Ekroos and others, Ympäristöoikeuden pääpiirteet (Main Features of
Environmental Law) (3rd edn, Sanoma Pro 2013) 562.
73 Reformatory process is explained at text to n 90.
74 EPA s 1.
75 Water Act 3:3. In matters requiring both permits, both permit considerations must be conducted inde-
pendently even when the processes are integrated, EPA s 47, Water Act 11:12.
76 Water Act 3:4; Erkki J Hollo, Pekka Vihervuori and Kari Kuusiniemi, ‘Environmental Law and
Administrative Courts in Finland’ (2010) 51(3) J Ct Innovation 51, 52–3; Pekka Vihervuori, ‘Private and
Public Ownership of Water Areas—Structures and Implications of the Finnish Model’ in Erkki J Hollo
(ed), Water Resources Management and the Law (EE 2017) 98.
77 Aulis Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable: A Treatise on Legal Justification (Reidel cop 1987) 89; Andrea M
Keessen and others, ‘European River Basin Districts: Are They Swimming in the Same Implementation
Pool?’ (2010) 22(2) JEL 197; text to n 127.
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Some of our cases dealt with Natura 2000, the Union-wide nature conservation
network that requires the prohibition of activities outside the protected area if they
endanger protected values.78 As appropriate, the Finnish Nature Conservation Act
section 65 requires the assessment of all such environmental impacts, and these are
also considered when deciding on an authorisation.79 In Finland the Natura 2000 im-
pact assessment is integrated into formal EIA.80 When in matters dealing with the
EPA only ‘significant pollution’ is a legitimate reason to reject a project, the broader
social or structural impacts analysed in an EIA cannot be taken into account.81
3.2 Procedural and Practical Realities Enabling Extensive Factual Review in
Finland
After this rough description of the substantial context, we sum up the three reasons
why the Finnish administrative-procedural system is fruitful terrain for the present
study.82 Firstly, regarding the intensity of review, even though the country follows
the continental pattern of examining only the legality of cases, that legality review is
understood broadly: within the limits of the appeal, the scope of courts’ review is
similar to that of the administrative authority.83 Here the Finnish judicial review is
reminiscent of the German system—but because of the other two aspects, the
Finnish courts have been evaluated as conducting broader reviews than their
German counterparts.84
Secondly, when dealing with matters involving the EPA or Water Act, the court
chamber consists not only of lawyer judges but also expert judges, who do not have
formal legal education but hold a technical or science degree.85 In this multi-
professional setting the courts should have a heterogeneous understanding of the
78 The Habitats Directive art 6(3). The decision-making process in the Habitats Directive and its relations
with the EIA process are explained in Lees (n 6) 193–5.
79 Finnish Nature Conservation Act s 65.2 and s 65.4 (‘NCA’, luonnosuojelulaki 255/2017); EPA s 48.3 ,
Water Act 1:2.
80 In cases when assessment according to the implementing legislation of the EIA Directive takes place,
NCA s 65.2; Ismo Pölönen, ‘Mikä riittää vai riittääkö mikään? Natura-arvioinnille asetetut vaatimukset
unionin tuomioistuimen linjan mukaan (What Is Enough? The Requirements of the Natura 2000
Assessments in the CJEU Case Law)’ (2019) 2 Ympäristöjuridiikka 10, 15, 17.
81 Ekroos and others (n 72) 277; Pölönen, ibid 24.
82 The Finnish system was originally a Swedish one, Pekka Vihervuori, ‘Förvaltningsprocessuella likheter
och olikheter mellan Sverige och Finland – axplock fran historia och nutid’ in Thomas Bull, Henrik
Jermsten and Sara Uhrbom (eds), Vänbok till Mats Melin (Iustus Förlag 2018) 451; Jan Darpö,
‘Environmental Justice through Environmental Courts? Lessons Learned from the Swedish Experience’ in
Jonas Ebbesson and Phoebe Okowa (eds), Environmental Law and Justice in Context (CUP 2019) 176.
83 Pekka Vihervuori, ‘Totuudesta hallintolainkäytössä (Truth in the Judicial Review of Administrative
Action)’ in Risto Nuolimaa, Pekka Vihervuori and Hannele Klemettinen (eds), Juhlajulkaisu Pekka
Hallberg 1944–12/6–2004 (Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys 2004) 496.
84 Tiina Paloniitty and Mariolina Eliantonio, ‘Scientific Knowledge in Environmental Judicial Review:
Safeguarding Effective Judicial Protection in the EU Member States?’ (2018) 27(4) EEELR 108, 111.
85 The expert judge system is thoroughly explained in Hanna Nieminen-Finne, Asiantuntija tuomarina.
Tekniikan ja luonnontieteiden alan hallinto-oikeustuomarit ympäristönsuojeluasioissa (Expert as a Judge:
Technical and Scientific Judges in Environmental Matters) (SLY 2020); also Tiina Paloniitty and Sinikka
Kangasmaa, ‘Securing Scientific Understanding: Expert Judges in Finnish Environmental Administrative
Judicial Review’ (2018) 27(4) EEELR 125.
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object of their inquiry.86 The expert judges participate in developing the court’s
understanding of both the legal and scientific sides of the case, and reconciling the
epistemological gap between sciences.87 Unfortunately, only matters dealing with the
EPA or Water Act benefit from expert judges’ review. At the level of first appeal,
these cases are centralised in one of the administrative courts (‘the Vaasa court’),
employing expert judges.88 Also in the Supreme Administrative Court only cases
dealing with the two acts benefit from the expert judge’s scrutiny.89
Thirdly, administrative courts are allowed not only to annul or injunct the case
but also amend the permit and its conditions.90 However, they are not allowed to re-
place the authority’s decision: should the case call for total reconsideration of the
matter, the courts must remit the case to the first instance administrative authority.91
This obligation is linked with the inquisitorial and investigative approach in use,
known as the ex officio principle: the court must actively investigate the matter and
establish that they have adequate information to make a ruling.92 The outcome of
this comprehensive investigation is not referred to as ‘evidence’—this concept is
reserved for the general courts93—but the factual matters are discussed as pertaining
to the adequate investigation of the matter, emphasising the objectives of impartial-
ity, proportionality and equality of judicial review.94 We apply this linguistic choice
in this article.
4 . W A T E R M O D E L S I N T E N E X A M I N A T I O N S
As mentioned above, we seek to examine if scientific models had been discussed in
the Court’s case law and, if so, how the Court had used, reacted to, or argued about
environmental models. To answer these two questions, we adopted a systematic ap-
proach and searched the open online repository of the SAC’s rulings that includes
decisions from 1980 on.95 Firstly, we searched the index words ‘model’ and ‘water’
and their variations, obtaining 165 results.96 After reading through them, 42 appeared
relevant to the questions we had posed. In nine of those 42 rulings, the Court
86 Paloniitty and Eliantonio (n 84) 111–12.
87 Wahlberg (n 3) 13, 181–82.
88 eg cases dealing with nature conservation or land use and building only are deliberated without the expert
judges, in Paloniitty and Kangasmaa (n 85) 134, 138.
89 As of 2018 leave to appeal has been demanded when taking matters to the SAC (Administrative Judicial
Procedure Act s 107 (‘AJPA’); laki oikeudenkäynnistä hallintoasioissa 808/2019); Paloniitty and
Kangasmaa (n 85) 133 fn 62.
90 Olli Mäenpää, Hallintoprosessioikeus (Judicial Procedure in Administrative Courts) (2nd edn, WSOYpro
2007) 502.
91 AJPA s 81 lists the possible actions for the court; replacing the original decision not included.
92 AJPA s 37; Mäenpää (n 90) 372.
93 Vihervuori (n 83) 496; Olli Mäenpää, ‘Judiciary v. Executive: Judicial Review and the Exercise of
Executive Power’ (2017) 2–4 JFT 242, 242–43; Mikael Hildén, ‘Opportunities and Challenges in
Providing and Using Scientific Knowledge in Environmental Appeal Cases in Finland’ in Kari
Kuusiniemi, Outi Suviranta and Veli-Pekka Viljanen (eds), Juhlajulkaisu Pekka Vihervuori 1950–25/8–
2020 (SLY 2020) fn 14 and text to it.
94 AJPA s 37.2.
95 The repository we used is Finlex, <https://www.finlex.fi/fi/> accessed 15 September 2020. The site has
also an English version that, however, covers only the legislation, not the courts’ rulings.
96 The first search was conducted on 25 October 2018; the complementary search on 31 October 2018.
Our temporal period included all cases in the online repository up until these dates.
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commented on, or analysed, models in detail, or they were otherwise evaluated as
fruitful material for the analysis. Later, in fall 2019, we added a tenth case to the ana-
lysis: the so-called Finnpulp ruling, in which the Court discussed water models at a
level of detail previously unseen.97 In Section 5 we discuss the significance of these
first steps of our case analysis. What does it say that only nine cases out of 207 in
total included extensive analysis of the environmental models estimating the environ-
mental impact?
4.1 ‘The Unseen’ and Other Initial Findings
Before embarking on the closer analysis, some preliminary remarks are required.
Firstly, the unseen: what we did not find? The oldest case in our search dates back
to 2002 but only to 2002, when the repository includes cases from year 1980 on.
Models were already prevalent then. How did the Court conceptualise models and
their output in the last century? Our informed guess is that, more than telling us any-
thing about a courts’ approach to models, the lack of findings illustrates the change
that has taken place in the Court’s reasoning. The discourse on administrative judi-
cial procedure and the work to develop it has been rich since the turn of the century.
The court’s impartiality, absence of bipartisan relationships, and the court’s dispute-
resolving function have all been debated, as has the constitutional obligation to give
reasons.98 We assume this development work may have influenced the Court’s prac-
tices and led to more thorough reasoning.
Secondly, most of the cases dealt with artificial groundwater plants and other
groundwater matters, not surface water models, even though the searches would
have enabled us to find both. Our best guess is that due to the straight-forward regu-
latory situation, groundwater models have gained legal decision-makers’ attention
more easily than surface water ones. Regulatory setting of surface waters is much
more diverse and complicated, leaving room for legal manoeuvres.99 The strict pro-
hibition against groundwater pollution leaves little room for legal debate, immediate-
ly moving attention to the impact assessment.100 Also, illustrating the same enduring
determination to protect groundwaters, the nation has a long history of effective
groundwater management, data collection, and development of groundwater mod-
els.101 As a combination, the openly available data and models have been readily at
97 The Finnpulp case (KHO 2019:166, ECLI:FI:KHO:2019:166), at text to n 141.
98 Ann-Mari Pitkäranta, Näytön arvioinnista tuloveroprosessissa (Assessment of evidence in income tax procedure)
(Edita 2004) 11, 35; Jyrki Virolainen and Petri Martikainen, Pro & Contra—Tuomion perustelemisen
keskeisiä kysymyksiä (Pro & Contra—Key aspects of justifying a judgement) (Talentum 2003) 129–30;
Pekka Hallberg, ‘Tuomioistuinten päätösten perusteleminen (Reasoning in Court Rulings)’ in Pekka
Hallberg (ed), Juhlajulkaisu Aulis Aarnio 1937–14/5–1997 (SLY 1997).
99 Many pieces of regulation are relevant to surface waters; the EPA is only the most important on pollu-
tion. The strict prohibition was originally part of Water Act, which otherwise allows all but free balancing
of interests, text to n 75ff. The strict prohibition is strikingly different from that.
100 Text to n 69. This consideration builds on the assumption that the courts prefer dealing with the legal
questions and are are more inclined to move to factual questions when room for legal interpretation is
limited. This perception may well be mistaken.
101 The strict prohibition was taken to the Water Act in 1962. Models for all types of groundwater aquafers
had already been made in the 1990s.







niversity hospital user on 09 April 2021
hand for those impact assessment deliberations that the legal context has made
critical.
Thirdly, regardless of the use of expert judges or the broad scope of their review,
the SAC—or the administrative court before it—have evaluated models only in a
very finite number of cases.102 In only three of the cases we analysed did the SAC
discuss in detail the implications that models had on the assessment of the environ-
mental impacts of the proposed plan, conceptualising them as uncertainty, risk, level
of adequate information etc. These cases are the Roine Case, the Alholmens Kraft
Case and the Finnpulp case.103 Naturally, we cannot evaluate whether the rest of the
cases would have benefitted from such a thorough deliberation, or whether models
were left undiscussed because such analysis was not necessary. It is, however, note-
worthy that, even though Finnish administrative courts have the constitutional, pro-
cedural and practical ability to embark on the factual considerations, modelling or
model uncertainties were found crucial only in such a limited number of cases.
These general remarks and reservations aside, the rulings did teach valuable les-
sons from the courts’ dealings with models. Let us now discuss the rulings in two set-
tings: first those addressing the uncertainty dilemma, and then those focusing on the
legal mechanisms to tackle uncertainties.
4.2 Court’s Concepts: Diverse Degrees of Uncertainty
The Court’s general comprehension of scientific uncertainty was at the heart of the
second-newest of the cases, the Roine Case.104 This case concerned an artificial
groundwater venture that might have affected a nearby Natura 2000 site. The deci-
sion followed closely the legal norm that the Natura 2000 sites are protected from
also indirect impacts, that is from activities taking place outside of the area’s bounda-
ries.105 The conservation values of the site were closely linked with the site’s ground-
water levels, and thus of concern when authorising undertakings outside the area.106
The Vaasa court discussed the role of the precautionary principle and scientific un-
certainty, noting that neither was a reason as such to disallow the venture: they only
obliged the authority to establish such permit conditions that would curb the harmful
impact.107 The Vaasa court’s stance on uncertainty was, however, stricter than this: it
stated that evaluations and statements must remove the uncertainty, and only then
could the permit conditions counteract the harmful impacts.108 This notion is natur-
ally scientifically incorrect, and should be understood only in its context. The Vaasa
court may have referred to the process order where the proponent provides the ad-
equate investigation and only then the court decides on the matter; most likely the
court implied that the investigation was not yet sufficient for a decision to take
102 As appropriate, when even courts with much narrower scopes of review have evaluated models’ suitabil-
ity. Not even the very high threshold of UK Wednesbury irrationality has prevented judges from finding
models at the core of legal disputes, Fisher and others (n 9) 259–62.
103 Respectively texts to n 104, n 120 and n 141.
104 SAC 2018:121 (‘The Roine Case’ KHO 2018:121 ECLI:FI:KHO:2018:121).
105 The Habitat’s Directive 6(2) art.
106 On the Finnish Natura 2000 implementation, see text to n 78.
107 The Roine Case; Sigel and others (n 36).
108 The Roine Case, Summary of the administrative court’s conclusions.
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place.109 However, this can also be taken as an example of why modellers ought to
better articulate and communicate their work.110
In appealing the case to the SAC, some parties involved complained about the
Vaasa court’s reasoning on the certainty of the knowledge models produce. Without
specifically referring to these complaints,111 the Court discussed scientific uncertainty
by referring to the guidelines set by the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU).112 The Court noted how the scientific assessments were too uncertain on
the undertaking’s detrimental consequences surpassing the acceptable threshold, and
hence, the permit should not have been granted in the first place.113 This was the
case in one-third of the plant’s planned area, at its edges. Because of this considerable
scientific uncertainty, the administration was found correct in not allowing the
undertaking to extend to those edges. Since the same uncertainties did not apply to
the other two-thirds of the area, the SAC upheld the Vaasa court’s ruling in that
regard.114
The characteristics of the model explain why the Court decided to restrict the
plant’s area. The groundwater model estimated the currents of water in the ground
and, as typical of such models, it was more uncertain at the edges of the area than in
its centre. The Vaasa court had not referred to these differences in uncertainty, but
the SAC found them crucial and justified its reasoning by pointing to the differences.
Another key reason was that the area in question was an especially small and sensi-
tive part of the Natura 2000 site. Production in the area might have brought about a
forbidden detrimental impact to the protected conservation values, especially with re-
gard to the size of the protected area.115
An earlier ruling, the Turku Case, on artificial groundwater undertakings, also dis-
cussed the uncertainties of models.116 The administrative court concluded that the
development’s long-term impacts could not be modelled with adequate certainty. In
this ruling the court’s obligation to examine the matter was coupled with the strict
prohibition of groundwater pollution.117 However, in this case the SAC did not find
that model uncertainties would have evoked the strict prohibition but stated that
closer monitoring obligations were enough to curb the risk of groundwater pollution.
Thus, the undertaking was permitted with amended permit conditions on monitor-
ing. Importantly, the Court found that the inherent uncertainty of models does not
always automatically lead to operationalising the strict prohibitions—‘strict prohib-
ition’ does not require that there should be full scientific certainty of no detrimental
impacts taking place. The Turku Case offers us an interesting example of the
109 See text to n 92.
110 Text to n 168.
111 The Roine Case, Dealings in the SAC.
112 The SAC referred to the CJEU rulings C-441/17 Commission v Poland (Forêt de Białowie_za) [2018]
ECLI:EU:C:2018:255 para 114; C-258/11 Sweetman and Others [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:220 para 44;
and C-387/15 and C-388/15 Orleans and Others [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:583 para 50.
113 The Roine Case, Dealings in the SAC, Chapter 4, subchapter on judicial review.
114 The Vaasa court had remitted the case back to the administrative authority, showing the limits of the re-
formatory process, The Roine Case, Dealings in the SAC, Chapter 4, subchapter on judicial review.
115 The Roine Case, Dealings in the SAC, Chapter 4, subchapter on judicial review.
116 The SAC 2008:58 (‘The Turku Case’ KHO 2008:58 ECLI:FIN:KHO:2008:58).
117 Texts to n 69 and n 100.
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mechanisms of environmental uncertainty adjudication. Monitoring becomes all
more central when uncertain matters, tilting towards acceptable, can be allowed to
proceed with advanced monitoring obligations.118 The case also left us pondering
whether better argumentation on the model uncertainties and risks involved might
have aided the legal side in their assessments, as discussed further in the
conclusions.119
A third case, also dealing with the strict prohibition of groundwater pollution,
went to the core of the reliability of models and the information they produce, and
invoked an interesting ruling on the relation between adequate investigation and ad-
ministrative authorizations. The substance matter of the Alholmens Kraft Case was
the impact of a waste burning plant’s ash utilization: the plan was to use the ash in
landfill cover structures.120 The administrative court had not allowed the plan to pro-
ceed. In this case, the SAC specifically commented on the administrative court’s rea-
soning on modelling uncertainty. It summed up its stance by saying that:
When assessing the credibility of modelling, the administrative court has not
taken into account modelling’s initial conditions and method of implementa-
tion. Modelling can never be a full equivalent of actual circumstances.121
The SAC stated that the model in the case was deliberately built to ensure that
no prohibited harm to health or environment was caused. To serve this purpose, the
model was written to estimate the worst-case scenario. In the SAC’s reasoning, the
fact that a model can never replicate the reality, but only approximate it, resulted in a
need to pay closer attention to the assumptions in the model itself. Due to the initial
choices of this model, it produced adequate information on the project’s prospective
outcome, contrary to the administrative court’s stance (finding the project’s risks
were not fully disclosed). This notwithstanding, the SAC withheld the administrative
court’s ruling: it was not certain that the planned project did not cause prohibited en-
vironmental harm.122 Thus, the instances differed in reasoning but coincided in out-
come. In the SAC’s understanding, the model produced adequate information on the
planned project’s impacts, but as such forbidden pollution of groundwater could
have resulted.123
118 The strict prohibition does not mean ban of all impacts and as such places the risks to the operator, if
they start an activity with uncertain impacts. In this case the responsibility was allocated to the oper-
ator—and the administration surveilling the monitoring; Hollo (n 68) 420.
119 Text to n 152.
120 SAC 2005:23 (‘Alholmens Kraft Case’ KHO 2005:23 ECLI:FIN:KHO:2005:23).
121 Alholmens Kraft Case, Dealings in the SAC; translation by the authors. ‘Mallinnuksen luotettavuutta
arvioidessaan hallinto-oikeus ei ole ottanut huomioon mallinnuksen lähtökohtaa ja toteutustapaa.
Mallinnus ei koskaan voi vastata täysin todellisia olosuhteita.’
122 The close content in both instances was about the dumping ground’s structures and whether or not to
build them from waste ash.
123 Interestingly, the administrative court’s ruling had a dissenting opinion from the expert judge. According
to the dissent, the proposed project fulfilled the Best Available Technique requirements and permit
should have been granted, the Vaasa Administrative Court 9.6.2003, as referred to by the SAC.
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4.3 Legal Mechanisms for Dealing with the Uncertainties
In the three cases discussed above, the SAC reviewed whether the matter had been
investigated thoroughly enough, and whether the uncertain estimates produced by
models constituted adequate information. The next group of rulings continues from
these considerations to the specific legal mechanisms with which the Court
addressed the various degrees of uncertainty. What legal tools does the Finnish legal
system offer, and how has the Court used them?
The Lakeuden Vesi Case offered one answer to the question—fixed permit dur-
ation—but the ruling also shed light on how the SAC combines different sources of
information in its decision-making to fill the gaps that models can leave.124 The case
was about a water abstraction plant whose environmental impacts on the ground-
water and surface water levels had been modelled. The model drew on information
gained from experimental pumpings that had been made in a relatively short time
span. It was estimated that the information available on the planned undertaking’s
long-term consequences was especially uncertain.125 In considering these long-term
impacts, the SAC referred to the RBMPs, and the Weser ruling on the normativity of
the environmental objectives in the RBMPs.126 The Lakeuden Vesi Case is among
the first in which the Court introduced its interpretation of the post-Weserian WFD:
endangering the achievement of objectives is relevant.127
Since the outcome of the model was especially uncertain in the longer term, the
SAC turned to the RBMPs, source of information dedicated to the needs of long-
term planning. In this case the proposed plan did not endanger the achievement of
the good status objective and could thus be approved. The SAC continued by stating
that, even though the applicant had presented adequate information on the planned
project’s prospective impacts—in other words, the model sufficed in general—there
were uncertainties regarding the long-term combined impacts of the planned project
and other activities in the area. This justified authorising the plant for a fixed term of
10 years.128 In the SAC’s reading, the post-Weserian WFD complements the Finnish
environmental legal system well, elegantly bringing together the needs of granting
permits despite uncertainty and gradually increasing scientific knowledge. We discuss
these adaptive traits in the concluding section.129
The Salo II Case offered a variation to this solution of fixed permit duration.130
The substance matter was also water abstraction, but in this case the appellants
criticised the groundwater model as being of poor quality. The SAC largely main-
tained the administrative court’s solution, which was to oblige the appellant to renew
124 SAC 13.4.2017 no: 1711 (‘Lakeuden Vesi Case’ KHO 13.4.2017 t. 1711).
125 Lakeuden Vesi Case, Dealings in the administrative court.
126 See text to n 58.
127 As noted above at text to n 77, it was left to the SAC to pronounce on the impact of the Weser ruling on
the domestic legal order. That is unfortunate in a statutory legal system—or in any system, for as Fisher
puts it, ‘a rule of the common law does not necessarily have the same shape or structure as a rule
enacted by a legislature’ in Douglas Fisher, Legal Reasoning in Environmental Law: A Study of Structure,
Form and Language (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 36.
128 The SAC followed a similar line of thought in spring 2018 in a sequence of aquaculture cases, eg SAC
26.4.2018 No 1952 (KHO 26.4.2018 t. 1952), SAC 26.4.2018 No 1953 (KHO 26.4.2018 t. 1953).
129 See text to n 152.
130 SAC 26.2.2016 No 605 (‘The Salo II Case’ KHO 26.2.2016 t. 605).
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the model during the plant’s first term of use and present then the new model. The
case revolved around Natura 2000 sites and the abstraction’s impact on their protec-
tion. The administrative court assessed the groundwater model used as being overly
positive: it had been created approximately 15 years earlier and drew on test pump-
ings conducted over a relatively short period of time in a vast area of complex geog-
raphy. Also, because the groundwater levels were higher than normal during the test
pumpings, the conclusions drawn from them were too optimistic. The administrative
court continued that, since more information was available and up-to-date models
would help to assess the amounts of water abstraction and hydrogeographical condi-
tions, an updated model was needed for the current situation.131 This did not, how-
ever, result in the planned project being rejected; it was authorised for a very short
time (for a few years), resembling a permit for testing purposes—for that end, the
matter had been investigated thoroughly enough.132
When the SAC upheld the administrative court’s ruling in the Salo II Case, it justi-
fied its stance with two arguments. Firstly, the plant was authorised for a very short
time, and secondly, the operator was obliged to monitor the plant’s impacts on the
groundwater levels.133 The monitoring obligation was also part of the legal toolkit in
the matter’s first round, in the Salo I Case.134 Uncertainties in groundwater models
had already been openly debated earlier during the process, as well as in the SAC.
Ruling on sufficient investigation was also the reason to take the decision to the
SAC’s annals.135 In the summary the Court stated that, because the investigation was
insufficient, the permit conditions had to be amended before an abstraction permit
could be granted. The Court amended the conditions on in multiple ways: it tight-
ened the monitoring obligation, significantly lowered the abstraction amount
allowed, made the permit temporary, and added other permit conditions constrain-
ing the plant from what had been planned.136
The Laukaa Case137 also discussed groundwater quality, but in the context of
land excavation; it was claimed that land excavation activities had caused the prod-
uctivity of the nearby artificial groundwater plant to fall. Here the SAC operated with
the strictest possible legal tool, that of rejecting the proposal. During the proceedings
in the SAC the appellant criticised the administrative authority’s model as inad-
equate: the model had been built on measurements performed over the course of
only one year. In the appellant’s opinion, such a model could not constitute adequate
review of their plant’s impacts and the Court should, on the contrary, rely on their
assessment of the plant’s environmental impacts. The SAC, however, upheld the ad-
ministrative court’s ruling, which had prohibited the appellant’s activities. According
131 The Salo II Case, Dealings in the administrative court, Water flow model.
132 The Salo II Case, Dealings in the administrative court, sufficiency of evidence. In this part the administra-
tive court’s argumentation momentarily lapsed. The court laconically declared that ‘The Administrative
Court states that knowledge of water abstraction’s consequences can be obtained only by abstracting
water.’ (In Finnish, ’Hallinto-oikeus toteaa, että vedenoton vaikutuksista saadaan selvitystä vain ottamalla
vettä’.).
133 The Salo II Case, Dealings in the SAC, conclusions.
134 SAC 2005:57 (‘The Salo I Case’ KHO 2005:57 ECLI:FIN:KHO:2005:57).
135 See n 144 and text to it.
136 The Salo I Case, summary.
137 SAC 16.11.2017 No. 5910 (KHO 16.11.2017 t. 5910).
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to the favoured argumentation, the appellant’s survey comprised individual measure-
ments performed on single days over multiple years, and such information did not
qualify as adequate information on the plant’s groundwater impacts—especially
when the administrative authority’s modelling revealed that groundwater flow was
from the excavation site towards the plant, strengthening the link between the two
undertakings. Thus, in this ruling the courts did not rely on individual measurements
performed over multiple years, but preferred the model’s output, even if it made use
of samples measured over only a single year.138
Two of the cases we found concerned models in a highly specialised context not
falling into the two categories analysed above—conceptualising uncertainty or choice
over legal mechanisms—but exemplify the strategic use of models in litigation. Both
cases dealt with one of the nation’s most controversial ventures, the Talvivaara/
Terrafame mine. The mine has been an abundant source not only of raw materials
but also momentous and long-term environmental problems, resulting in multiple ju-
dicial proceedings.139 In the ruling SAC 2017:75 (Talvivaara II), the appellant
claimed that the models used by the company were trade secrets and could not be
disclosed. Regrettably to the investigative mind, the administrative court or the SAC
did not need to take a stance on this fascinating question: the mining company went
bankrupt, revealing the information to the bankruptcy trustees and later to the state-
run company that succeeded it, Terrafame. Thus, we do not know whether a model
could be a trade secret.
Another ruling from the Talvivaara saga discussed the need to revise the model in
use. The matter discussed in case SAC 2014:187 (Talvivaara I) was important
enough to earn the ruling a place in the SAC’s annals (yearbook of the most import-
ant rulings).140 The ruling’s legal question was on the Finnish EPA’s section 62, on
the notification process that should be used only in urgent and dire circumstances
when the primary mechanism—re-evaluating the environmental permit—is too
slow. The appellant claimed that they needed to revise the models before being able
to ensure that prohibited water pollution would not happen, and that revision work
was why they failed to begin the notification process in time. The SAC did not ap-
prove of this logic, retaining the scope of EPA section 62 for emergencies only.
4.4 Binding the Legal and Scientific Assessments Together
(with the Weser Case)
The last ruling, we discuss is the Finnpulp case, concluded on 19 December 2019
and a landmark ruling in many aspects.141 In the Finnpulp case, the Court discussed
138 Sufficient measurement data is a vital part of model performance. Measurements are used to set the
boundary and initial conditions, and for model calibration and validation, N Schuwirth and others, ‘How
to make Ecological Models Useful for Environmental Management’ (2019) 411 Ecol Model art no
108784, 2–3.
139 The story of the Talvivaara mine began as national pride but continued as conflict when environmental
impacts of unprecedented scale and complexity started to emerge, Rauno Sairinen, Heidi Tiainen and
Tuija Mononen, ‘Talvivaara Mine and Water Pollution: An Analysis of Mining Conflict in Finland’
(2017) 4 Ext Ind Soc 640, 649.
140 SAC 2014:187 (KHO 2014:187 ECLI:FIN:KHO:2014:187).
141 The SAC 2019:166 (‘The Finnpulp Case’ KHO 2019:166, ECLI:FI:KHO:2019:166). The case was con-
sidered in a chamber of two expert judges, one with technical and the other with scientific education.
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the modeller’s inferential process and method extensively and in unprecedented de-
tail. Its decision relied on the factual analysis, which was bound up elegantly with the
legal components of the precautionary principle and the concept of ‘significant pollu-
tion’ pivotal in the EPA’s regime. Simultaneously, the Court took the opportunity to
settle its reading of the Weser ruling.142
The Finnpulp case was about a pulp (or biomass) plant planned in the city of
Kuopio in Eastern Finland. The plant attracted the strongest opposition mainly due
to its planned site, size and production volume: it would have discharged its waste
water into Lake Kallavesi, near where the city extracted its drinking water and had its
key recreational area. The first-level approving authorization was taken to the Vaasa
court, which, after conducting an on-site inspection, approved the plan but modified
the permit conditions. The SAC granted leave to appeal and, while considering its
stance, conducted another on-site inspection.143 Having both courts inspecting the
same site is a sign of the importance of the planned location in this case. To the in-
dignation of the hopeful operator, the SAC decided to annul the permit. The ruling
was taken into the annals of the Court, implying its role as a precedent (that is, if
one accepts the notion that the Court sets precedents).144
The Finnpulp case is significant in three aspects, all of them resulting from the
fact that the Weser ruling and the Finnpulp ruling are cut from the same cloth: they
are both well-reasoned and unequivocal pieces of judicial decision-making. Firstly,
the Finnpulp case clarified the domestic legal status of whether the norms set in the
Weser ruling are also to be implemented in Finland: thanks to the loyalty principle
and principle of indirect effect in the EU law, they are, regardless of whether the do-
mestic legislator has been unhurried in its actions.145 Secondly, the Court also eluci-
dated that, in matters dealing with both the EPA and the post-Weserian WFD, three
distinct matters must be considered: the permit conditions; the precautionary prin-
ciple; and the norms established in the Weser ruling, ie the non-deterioration prin-
ciple and the obligation to reach the good status. None of these attenuate each
other, nor does passing one threshold equal passing all three. But if an impact
breaches the WFD’s non-deterioration principle, that impact counts as ‘significant
pollution’ in the EPA’s regime (a context where the precautionary principle must be
considered).146 Here the Court corrected the Vaasa court, which had merged the
precautionary principle and the non-deterioration principle in its reasoning. The con-
cept of ‘pollution’ does not inevitably encompass the WFD’s norms, but both must
The decision was the result of a vote (5–2) with one technical expert judge and one legally trained judge
dissenting.
142 To the extent that a court can; see text to n 126.
143 Requiring leave to appeal is a novelty in Finnish administrative procedure; it has been used in the SAC
since 2018. On-site inspections are regulated in the EPA s 197.1, the Water Act 15:4.2 and in the AJPA
s 36. On the rarity of on-site inspections, see Paloniitty and Kangasmaa (n 85) 133 fn 60, 135 fn 80.
144 A very concise summary of the vivid discourse on the matter is in Paloniitty and Kangasmaa (n 85) 133
fn 62.
145 Similar argumentation was used before in the Sierilä Case, when the Court decided on the same question
in the context of the Water Act. The SAC 2017:87 at 4.2.5.5.1 (KHO 2017:87,
ECLI:FI:KHO:2017:87); Sara Kymenvaara and others, ‘Variations on the same Theme: Environmental
Objectives of the Water Framework Directive in Environmental Permitting in the Nordic Countries’
(2019) 28(2) RECIEL 197, 203.
146 Finnpulp case at 4.2.3; text to n 69.
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be assessed separately—and negotiating the precautionary principle is yet another in-
dependent legal manoeuvre.147
The third aspect is the role played by the surface water model. In our 10-case
examples, the Finnpulp case was the only one in which the Court discussed the nic-
eties of the modeller’s inferential process—and, as an outcome, found the model in-
adequate for its purpose. The ruling is a prime example of the possibilities of the
procedural and practical realities in the last instance of court.148 The coupled hydro-
dynamic and water quality model was built to estimate the proposed plant’s impact
on the nearby lake waters. The Court analysed the model extensively, considering
not only the known features of the model and its outcome, but also the unknowns.
In reflecting on whether the model—originally designed for use in coastal waters—
was apposite to the inland lake processes, the Court noted that the (inevitable) tech-
nical simplifications in the model were in the numerical solutions of the flow equa-
tions and the model grid size. The Court continued by starkly criticising the oxygen
modelling and noted its results as the weakest point of the water impact assessments:
the model was found overestimating the decomposition rate of organic matter. In its
summing up in the legal evaluation, the Court listed factors excluded from the mod-
elling—the combined effect of sulphite, phosphorus, oxygen consumption and heat
load—that nonetheless affect the lake’s eutrophication development. The legal–fac-
tual assessment was holistic: the Court concluded that the combined and long-term
water impacts were too uncertain for approval.
The Court implemented the Weser ruling in the Finnish legal system along the
lines that it had established in its earlier cases: emissions from new projects must not
hinder the achievement of the WFD’s good status objective.149 The condition of the
recipient water body also played a significant role. Particularly because of eutrophica-
tion, the trend in Lake Kallavesi tended towards being of poorer status, justifying a
more stringent attitude towards a new, significant and long-term emission source.
Major industrial operators do not usually wish to proceed with their plans with tem-
porary permits. This was the case also here: the operator had declined the option of
a temporary permit, leaving one legal mechanism to tackle scientific uncertainties
unavailable.
Another legal mechanism that might have been the operator’s saving grace had
deliberately been removed from the legislation in 2015, when a section on regular
reviews of permits was deleted from the Finnish EPA.150 The Court specifically
noted that adding a permit condition on regular reviews of permits meant that they
lacked an option to revise the permit conditions later, if the currently uncertain emis-
sions were later to stabilise at a certain level. The Court continued by stating that the
147 The Vaasa Court had taken the EPA’s ‘must be taken into account’ reference quite literally: it stated that
since they had taken the good status objective into account in their evaluation of the EPA-based pollu-
tion, the obligations laid down in the WFD had been fulfilled. The Vaasa Court Decision No: 18/0222/
2 given on 21 September 2018 [at 110-1] (Vaasan HaO 21.9.2018 nro 18/0222/2).
148 Text to n 57.
149 Text to n 128.
150 The Government’s proposal 423/2015 (HE 423/2015). The mandatory check-up points were removed
as an action to streamline the environmental permitting system, with hopes that EPA s 89 on changing
the permit would be enacted more often; text to n 177.
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still existing clause on specific investigation of a permitted project cannot cover for
the absence of regular reviews, which were more holistic in their scope, and that sci-
entific uncertainties at the time of permit consideration cannot be tamed with permit
conditions requiring later specific investigations on emissions central to the proposed
plant’s operation—here the long-term water impacts on Lake Kallavesi.151
5 . W H O S E U N C E R T A I N T I E S , W H O S E P R I N C I P L E S ? N E G O T I A T I N G
T H E B A L A N C E
5.1 Ten Cases Threading the Continuum of Uncertainty Assessments
According to our sample of cases, the courts have reacted to models in three ways.
In the vast majority of the cases, the courts had an uncomplicated relationship with
the models. The courts did not extensively discuss them or refer to their specifics—
only incidental mentions in reasoning reveal that models were involved.
Occasionally, the courts had reason to employ their right to consider also the factual
matters. In these rulings, the courts pondered models, their particularities and out-
comes, and their implications for the matter at hand. The 10 SAC rulings we dis-
cussed above in detail are such: the courts invested time and effort to understand the
niceties of the models involved and the challenges that could result from their char-
acteristics. The Court relied on the concept of uncertainty and utilised the legal
mechanisms at its disposal in balancing the uncertainty of the proposed project’s
consequences with the norms and principles constraining the matter. In general,
these legal mechanisms are almost identical to the legal mechanisms employed in
executing the precautionary principle in the Australian context, exemplifying the
adaptive management approach.152 These adaptive traits are discussed in the closing
section.153 Of the 206 rulings we originally found that less than one and half per-
cent—three cases, the Alholmens Kraft Case, the Roine Case and the Finnpulp
Case154—discussed modelling extensively. Yet in none of them did the Court inter-
fere with the modeller’s inferential process.155 The Court may have described the pro-
cess but it did not, for example, remit a case to administration, calling for updates or
amendments to the model, or request for new impact estimates created with an
amended model.156
At the end of the day, a line seems to have been drawn between facts and values
in Finnish judicial review.157 Tentatively due to the expertise readily at hand, the
Court can identify the cases in which modelling has not been of the desired quality.
It can explicate the frailties it recognises, and analyse the uncertainties and the risk of
151 Finnpulp case at 4.2.4; EPA s 54. The two dissenting judges (one legally trained, one expert judge with
technical background) would have amended the permit conditions so as to include an obligation to con-
duct specific investigations in five and ten years’ time, see the Finnpulp case, Dissenting opinion.
152 Preston (n 14) 139–40. Also, the overall argumentation on models and their legal implications is greatly
reminiscent of the arguments identified by Fisher and others (n 9) 259.
153 Text to n 168.
154 Respectively, texts to n 120, n 104 and n 141.
155 Text to n 13.
156 There may have been practical reasons for the reluctance to remit: going through the whole process
again would protract the already long processes.
157 Text to n 40.
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detrimental outcomes. If the model is found to be unsatisfactory or unsuitable, the
Court disregards it and the information it produces. Instead of relying on the model,
the Court relies on the source data instead—in other words, it replaces the model
producing under-par environmental impact assessments with its own understanding
of the likely future impacts. If the stakes are high enough, disregarding the inapt
model can even leave room for direct application of the precautionary principle: if
better scientific assessments or legal mechanisms are not available or are found inad-
equate, the Court is left with balancing of principles.
Based on our analysis, it appears that models are placed under strict scrutiny in
Finnish judicial review. They are expected to show, with high enough confidence,
the expected impacts on waters, and if they fail to do this—because of the high
uncertainties or otherwise—they risk being regarded as useless.158 The uncertainty
and limitations in the modelling process become the pivotal question of whether to
trust the model at all. This is partially a consequence of the fact/value separation.
When reforming the permit but not the model is accepted, the latter can quickly face
full rejection, if full acceptance is the only other option. Especially in major undertak-
ings—such as the Finnpulp plant—the legal mechanisms may not be that useful
when most of them operate with the temporal aspects. When simultaneously the size
of the project increases the risks, the modelling may quickly seem under-par when
compared with the requirements of the precautionary principle.
This brings us back to the relations between scientific uncertainty assessment and
environmental principles, our porous yet prevailing boundary between science and
society. As Scotford points out, environmental law is immersed in principles that
have been readily adopted around the globe but remain vague in essence.159 Our
case study made the legal and non-legal application of these contingent principles
prominent.160 Most of the legal mechanisms we identified belong to the Court’s
toolbox for promoting precaution without needing to engage directly in the weighing
and balancing of principles.161 As we have seen, the precautionary action against det-
rimental outcomes begins as early as the modelling and continues in decision-
making and judicial review, exemplifying an evolution of factual–evaluative com-
plexes. According to Del Mar, these devices ‘can be profitably analyzed, and
explained, as having on the one hand a factual side, and on the other, an evaluative
side’.162
If accepted, this notion calls for reconsidering forms of legal reasoning, the defin-
ition of ‘legal’ in particular.163 In the cases examined, the fact/value distinction was
158 According to our case analysis, the SAC has thus been successful in recognizing ‘junk science’, Pascual
and others (n 11) 470.
159 Scotford (n 17) 1–5.
160 ibid 3.
161 In other words, employing the legal mechanisms overcame the first condition of applying the principle:
the threat of serious or irreversible damage, Preston (n 14) 129ff. Conservative application of weighing
and balancing of principles is a common trait in Finnish judicial review, familiar from Dworkin’s think-
ing, in which principles were the last resort when rules had failed, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously, New Imprint with Appendix: A Reply to Critics (Duckworth 1978) 187ff. Argumenting with
principles is reserved for the ‘hard cases’, most difficult and few in number.
162 Del Mar (n 40) 63, using the concept of ‘vulnerability’as an example.
163 Sustainable environmental governance tends to induce such needs, Fisher (n 127) 57.
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upheld in Court, and judicial reasoning was grounded in an accurate understanding
of models and their output, and the line of approved review—ie review that does not
necessitate rendering the matter back to the first instance for reconsideration of
facts—was drawn between permit conditions (reviewed) and modelling (withheld).
Though formally legitimate, the questions we touched upon at the outset linger.164
Comprehending uncertainty assessments as a continuum makes the constitutional
constraints obstructing review of all mechanisms addressing the uncertainty appear
obscure or arbitrary.165 If the focus is on the axiological choices shaping the legitim-
acy of the proposed project, should the line rather not be drawn at the decision over
parameters, choice of competing models, or some other point of the modeller’s infer-
ential process? Also, a more diverse toolbox for addressing the continuum than
merely disregarding inadequate models might advance the same end. Discussing the
boundaries might simultaneously enhance transparency and open argumentation.
Approaching the uncertainty assessment gradually by default—first with the scientif-
ic, then with the legal mechanisms—would counteract the risk of leaving axiological
decisions hidden within scientific evaluations.
From a comparative perspective, these thoughts further emphasise the contingent
nature of environmental law.166 This holistic approach to the administration of envir-
onmental impact assessment underscores the differences in national administrative–
legal procedures on courts’ faculties for reviewing the factual matters.167
5.2 Legal Mechanisms Advancing Reciprocality, Relying on Model
Transparency
As has been emphasised earlier, the puzzle is not merely a legal dilemma solved with-
in the legal sphere—not even in a jurisdiction of expert judges.168 The cases we ana-
lysed also offer many practical learning points for modellers wishing to advance the
usefulness of models in the legal context. In the Turku Case we were left wondering
whether the Court could have reasoned its decision better if it had more detailed in-
formation about the modeller’s realities and decisions.169 Thus, we concur with the
stance that there is a need to make the modelling process transparent and disclose
their inferential methods.170 A more transparent and systematic way of dealing with
the uncertainties and reducing subjectivity in the modelling procedure and outcome
assessment could be achieved with following good modelling practice and reporting
the model structure, the limitations in its use, the simplifications and assumptions,
the uncertainty sources and their effect on the model output.171 Also courts with
164 Text to n 6.
165 Text to n 69.
166 Pedersen (n 17).
167 Paloniitty and Eliantonio (n 84).
168 Text to n 52; Fisher and others (n 4) 1718, 1721.
169 Text to n 116.
170 Pascual and others (n 11) 429, 470–1. Achieving full transparency may be wishful thinking. Modelling is
a form of evolution, new models building on the earlier ones, thus disclosing all assumptions and their
relevances becomes a trial, Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics II (Robert Bononno tr, University of
Minnesota Press 2011) 269–83, 273.
171 This makes the boundary between the modeller and decision-maker less opaque by increasing the mod-
el’s credibility and trust amongst the decision-makers, GAK van Voorn and others, ‘A Checklist for
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fewer resources than the Court at hand might benefit from more transparent model-
ling practice: it might help in reviewing whether a manifest error has occurred, or an
unreasonable or irrational decision delivered.172
If modellers want their work to be correctly understood in courts, they should
take care to identify, estimate, quantify and especially communicate the uncertainties
accurately.173 Any limitations in temporal or spatial scales should be stated clearly.
The quality of the input data and the resulting limitations on the range of use for the
model should be explained in terms of the intended use of the model—as seen in
the Finnpulp Case, models for coastal waters are not necessarily apt for inland
lakes.174 Sensitivity to alternative inputs or assumptions should be documented.
Iterative updating of the model structure and parameters and use of up-to-date moni-
toring data would eventually reduce the models’ uncertainties and thus enhance their
predictive capability.175 When this is done, reciprocal action and decisions on the
permissible level of uncertainty, or the level of acceptable risk, could be left for the
legal sphere to make.
When dealing with iterative processes, enhancing transparency may simultaneous-
ly advance reciprocality and adaptivity. In modelling, assessment of accuracy happens
alongside learning. Modelling should be adaptive in such a way that it can effectively
use prior knowledge and data and update the predictions whenever new information
is obtained.176 The rulings we examined illustrate how courts can accommodate the
reality of modelling, and incorporate at least weak traces of adaptivity and reciprocal-
ity in the governance system. Firstly, the courts can shorten the time before the au-
thorization needs to be revised in the administration (the Lakeuden Vesi Case).177
Secondly, the courts can require updated information: when the models were
criticised as outdated at the outset, the Court demanded that a revised model be pre-
sented at the time of permit revision (the Salo II Case).178 Thirdly, the courts can re-
quire active monitoring to receive up-to-date information about the development of
the recipient (the Turku Case).179 Fourthly, courts can couple the individual author-
ization’s duration to the schedules of other information sources, as was done when
the permit’s length was harmonised with WFD’s RBMP cycles. The RBMP’s 6-year
cycle resulted in the permit being re-evaluated right after the new RBMP was pub-
lished, and the new information could be used to assess the undertaking’s permit
Model Credibility, Salience, and Legitimacy to Improve Information Transfer in Environmental Policy
Assessments’ (2016) 83 Environ Modell Softw 224.
172 Fisher (n 9) 260; the EU law obligations towards that end are analyzed in Mariolina Eliantonio, ‘The
Impact of EU Law on Access to Scientific Knowledge and the Standard of Review in National
Environmental Litigation: A Story of Moving Targets and Vague Guidance’ (2018) 27(4) EEELR 115;
for the Irish developments see Áine Ryall, ‘Enforcing the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive in
Ireland: Evolution of the Standard of Judicial Review’ (2018) 7(3) TEL 515.
173 Uusitalo and others (n 41).
174 Text to n 148.
175 Text to n 19ff; Jakeman and others (n 22); Schuwirt and others (n 138).
176 Meaning that modelling reflects the principles of adaptive management, Paloniitty (n 6) 54–104;
Preston (n 14).
177 Text to n 124. As was voiced in the Finnpulp case, the option was recently made unavailable in Finland,
text to n 150.
178 Text to n 130.
179 Text to n 116.
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conditions in revision (the Lakeuden Vesi Case).180 These cases are promising signs
of the courts’ capabilities to respond to the challenge.
The beginning of the path forward is thus identified for both sides: modellers to
enhance their practice and the courts to continue recognising the gradually decreas-
ing scientific uncertainty in their rulings. Uncertainty assessment is one continuum
and transparent reduction of it is another, but the latter is also a reciprocal exercise.
The trick for both trades is to negotiate the right balance of these continuums. If
allowed, environmental models and their judicial review could ebb and flow between
the factual and normative worlds, making the most of both and their common
ground, the precautionary principle.
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